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Abstract 
This paper extends the closed economy analysis of strategic interaction between labor 
unions and the monetary authority in Lippi (REStud 2003) to a two-country open economy 
framework. It sheds light on the real effect of foreign central bank conservatism, which—
through a strategic mechanism that operates via the terms of trade between the two 
independent monetary policy makers—entails wage moderation. The impact of domestic 
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* Bank of Italy, Economic Research Unit, Genoa Branch. 1 Introduction1
Strategic monetary policy literature points out that central bank aversion to inﬂation (“conser-
vatism” as deﬁned by Rogoff (1985)) has real effects on equilibrium outcomes in presence of
non-atomistic wage setters (e.g. Lippi 2003, Coricelli et al. 2004, Soskice and Iversen 2000,
Bratsiotis and Martin 1999).2 Intuitively, a large trade union understands that an increase in its
members’ wage not only leads to higher inﬂation, but also prompts a monetary response which
depends on the degree of conservatism.
These studies have mainly focused on two strategic channels through which central bank
conservatism prompts unions to modify their wage demands. First, as nominal wages are nego-
tiated taking as given the nominal wages of the other unions, each union anticipates inﬂationary
pressures curtailing the other unions’ real wages. This reduction makes labor services provided
by other unions more competitive, thereby triggering labor substitution across ﬁrms. Central
bank conservatism may, however, encourage wage demands, since it decreases the decline in
the other unions’ real wages by curbing inﬂation. Such a mechanism is known as “substitution
effect” (e.g. Cukierman and Lippi 1999, Lippi 2003). Second, strong central bank preference
for price stability renders monetary policy tighter. Therefore, a conservative central bank in-
creases the elasticity of aggregate labor demand to nominal wage hikes. This channel, which
Lippi (2003) calls “output effect,” has been extensively studied in the past decade (e.g. Brat-
siotis and Martin 1999, Soskice and Iversen 1998, 2000, Coricelli et al. 2004, 2006, Gnocchi
2009).
Yet in an open-economy setting there is a third mechanism that operates through the trade
channel. Holding foreign prices constant, an increase in wages improves the terms of trade
and causes expenditure in both countries to switch from the domestically produced good to
the foreign produced good. At the same time, this favorable shift in the terms of trade drives
up the relative real wage of domestic worker and so produces a “beggar-thy-neighbor” welfare
spillover in the sense that the burden of labor input into production switches from domestic
workers to foreign workers (“terms-of-trade effect”).
Early contributions on optimal monetary policymaking in the presence of large unions do
not investigate these three strategic channels simultaneously. The main novelty of the present
paper is to embed all of them within a single micro-founded framework. Drawing on Corsetti
andPesenti(2001), Iintroduceanopen-economydimensionintheLippi’s(2003)setting. Inthis
1I would like to thank seminar participants at Siena University and the Twenty-First Irish Economic Associa-
tion annual conference for helpful comments. I would also like to acknowledge detailed comments and suggestions
from Alberto Dalmazzo, Giovanni Di Bartolomeo and Charles Wyplosz, as well as ﬁnancial support from the Ital-
ian Ministry for Education, Universities and Research. Part of this project was undertaken during my stay at the the
Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies of Geneva. Correspondence: Banca d’Italia, Genoa
Branch, Economic Research Unit, Via Dante 3, 16121, Genoa, Italy. E-mail: vincenzo.cuciniello@bancaditalia.it.
The views expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily reﬂect those of the Bank of Italy. The
usual disclaimer applies.
2See Cukierman (2004) and Calmfors (2001) for a review of this literature.
5case, foreign conservatism results in welfare gains by inducing wage moderation. Intuitively,
as long as higher domestic inﬂation created by domestic wage setters is perceived as improving
the terms of trade, there is an incentive to raise wages. This incentive is, however, lessened by
foreign monetary conservatism, which, restraining the adjustment of the exchange rate, reduces
relative inﬂation in the domestic country.
This theoretical result ﬁnds empirical support in the experience of the European countries
in the wake of Paul Volcker’s appointment as chairman of the U.S. Federal Reserve. During the
Volcker disinﬂation from 1979:Q3 to 1987:Q3, the Fed acquired credibility for low inﬂation.
At the same time, as illustrated in Figure 1, this aggressive monetary policy tightening was
accompanied by falling wage growth rates in Europe, where negotiations generally involve
strong trade unions that set wages at the national or industry level (see Nickell et al. 2005).
Figure 1: European Wage Rate (Four-Quarter Growth Rate)











Notes: The gray band indicates Paul Volcker’s period as Fed Chairman. Data for the euro area are
drawn from the Area Wide Model dataset (Fagan et al. 2001).
The ﬁnal part of the paper ﬂeshes out how domestic conservatism and centralization of
wage setting affect real outcomes. Installing a monetary authority that is more inﬂation averse
than society leads labor unions to anticipate a smaller inﬂationary impact from the increase in
their nominal wage. The resulting “beggar-thy-neighbor” incentive to move the terms of trade
through inﬂationary pressure is impeded, while the substitution effect stemming from ﬁrms be-
comes looser. Similarly, the presence of more concentrated labor markets has the overall effect
of dampening the substitution mechanism relative to the incentive to use strategically the terms
6of trade. It turns out that the condition determining the welfare gains from domestic monetary
conservatism and centralization of wage setting depends not only on the output effect, as in
Lippi (2003), but also on the term-of-trade effect. Speciﬁcally, domestic aversion to inﬂation
and more centralized wage setting are welfare maximizing when the output and terms-of-trade
effects dominate the substitution effect.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3
describes the equilibrium solution of the non-cooperative policy game. Section 4 disentangles
thewelfareeffectsofeachstrategicmechanismandofmonetaryconservatismandcentralization
of wage setting. Section 5 concludes.
2 The model
The model combines monopolistic competition and nominal rigidities in the labor market. The
economy consists of two equally-sized countries, Home (H) and Foreign (F). Each country is
specialized in the production of a traded good that can be manufactured in a variety of brands.
Each brand in turn is produced by a monopolistically competitive ﬁrm. Prices are perfectly
ﬂexible.3 Money enters the model via a cash-in-advance constraint. There are no impediments
or costs to trade across borders, so the law of one price holds and both countries are assumed
to have freely ﬂoating exchange rates. Wages are contractually ﬁxed for one period (contract
period in the sequel)4 and are set by a ﬁnite number of unions.
The timing is as follows. At the beginning of the contract period, monopolistic unions
simultaneously set nominal wages in their country of origin anticipating the monetary policy.
Next, monetary policy is simultaneously conducted in each country by a conservative central
bank. Finally, households consume while ﬁrms set prices and hire labor.
2.1 Households
Each country is populated by a continuum of measure one of identical households. Members in
eachfamilyareindexedby j2[0;1]. Foreignvariablesaredenotedwithanasterisk. Households
preferences are given by







3The companion Appendix, posted on the author’s homepage (now at http://sites.google.com/site/
vincenzocuciniello), presents an extension to partial price adjustment mechanisms and exchange rate pass-
through. The main results still hold.
4Multi-period dynamics are not key to the strategic effects I will investigate here.
7where L(j) is the total amount of type j labor supplied by a household member and C denotes















sumption bundles of the Home-produced traded good and of the Foreign-produced traded good
respectively. The elasticity of substitution between brands produced within a given country is
constant at ϕ > 1.
The consumption-based price index aggregates over the price of the Home and Foreign



















In the absence of market segmentation across countries, the law of one price holds, PFt =
EtP
Ft and P
Ht = PHt=Et, where E is the nominal exchange rate (domestic currency per unit of
foreign currency), and P
H and P
F are respectively the prices of Home and Foreign goods in
Foreign currency.
At the beginning of each period households enter with nominal balances Mt 1 and receive
a lump-sum transfer, (xt  1)Ms
t 1, from the Home government, where xt is the gross growth
rate of the Home money supply, Ms
t 1. Seignorage revenue is thrown away at the end of every
period. The representative household splits into a worker and a shopper. Trading takes place





Pt(h)Ct(h)dh  Mt 1+(xt  1)Ms
t 1:









where D are dividends from ownership of domestic ﬁrms and Mt denotes domestic money to
take into the next period. I assume that the wage for each labor type, W(j), is set by a union
representing that type of labor. For a given wage, W(j), each worker supplies the quantity
of labor, L(j), that is determined by the aggregation of ﬁrms’ labor demand decisions (and
5Note that the assumption of Cobb-Douglas preferences over traded goods in conjunction with zero initial bond
holdings entails the redundancy of global securities market (see Corsetti and Pesenti 2001).
8allocated uniformly across households). Thus, both W(j) and L(j) are taken as given by each
individual household.
As in Erceg et al. (2000) and much of the subsequent literature, members of each family
perfectly insure each other against variations in labor income so that they face the same budget
constraint and make the same consumption choices even if they have different wages. Foreign
households are modeled in an analogous way.
2.2 Firms
I assume a continuum of monopolistically competitive ﬁrms indexed by h 2 [0;1], each pro-
ducing a differentiated brand of the Home good. Firms set prices in every period and produce
output,Y(h), according to the following production technology








0 < α < 1; σ > 1;
where σ is the elasticity of input substitution, L(h; j) denotes the demand of a typical ﬁrm
residing in the Home country for labor services j supplied by domestic workers














Aggregate output is obtained by integrating across ﬁrms Yt =
∫ 1
0 Yt(h)dh.
Each ﬁrm in any given period chooses the price of brand so as to maximize proﬁt subject to
demand. The proﬁt function for a typical producer is as follows
(9) Dt(h) = PHt(h)YHt(h) WtYHt(h)1=α:
As shown in the companion Appendix, the global demand function for the representative brand
produced in the Home country is given by









where the terms of trade in the Home country, TOT 
EP
F
PH , is deﬁned as the price of imports
relative to the price of exports, denominated in the Home currency.
92.3 Conservative central banks
Monetary policy is conducted by a Rogoff-conservative central bank in each country (Rogoff
1985). I draw on Lippi (2003) and assume that the objective function of the monetary authority
is modeled as follows




t β > 0;
where β is a measure of monetary conservatism,U denotes the representative household’s util-
ity, (1), and p  logP.6 In any period t the central bank maximizes (11) with respect to the
money supply, mt, subject to the private sector equilibrium, namely a sequence of prices and
quantities that clears all markets in every period.
Conventional wisdom suggests that an explicit mandate for the central bank to deliver a low
and stable rate of inﬂation is an important institutional device to assure price stability (see e.g.
Cukierman 1992).7 The Treaty on European Union and the Statute of the European System
of Central Banks state that the European Central Bank has the primary goal of conducting
monetary policy in order to maintain price stability. In this respect, the β parameter can be a
way to model that institutional design. Henceforth, I assume that Home and Foreign central
banks may have different preferences toward inﬂation, respectively β and β.
2.4 Unions
Workers are organized in n > 1 labor unions. All labor types are unionized and equally dis-
tributed across unions. Therefore, each union u has mass 1=n(=
∫
j2ud j). In such a setup,
both the degree of wage centralization and the unions’ ability to internalize the consequences
of their actions are proportional to the unions’ size: the fewer the unions, the more each union
internalizes the impact of its own wage settlement on aggregate wage.
The simplifying assumption that all labor types are equally distributed across unions is quite
common in the literature on non-atomistic wage setting. However, it is worth noticing that
European unions are organized along industrial/professional lines.8 Since this would not add
insights, but would make the model presentation more complicated, I simplify by not modeling
this structure explicitly.
In any period t the representative union maximizes the utility functional of its members (of
mass 1=n)
6In what follows, I will denote the natural logarithm of any variable Z by the corresponding lower-case letter;
thus z  logZ. Without loss of generality, I normalize the initial period nominal wage, money supply, and general
price level to unity, so that the log of these variables are an approximation of their percentage increase.
7Another rationale explored in the literature is that central banks tend to take a longer view of the policy process
than do politicians.
8Vartiainen (2002) and Holden (2003), for example, assume that unions are sectoral: in each country one union
sets the wage in the tradable sector while another union sets the wage in the non-tradable sector.








with respect to the wage rate, wt(u), subject to private sector equilibrium and optimal monetary
stance.
3 Equilibrium
I assume a one-shot two-stage game. Nominal wages are set by unions in the ﬁrst stage of the
game in an uncoordinated way. They have full information about the reaction functions of the
central banks and take them into account in the wage setting process. In other words, each
union acts as Stackelberg leader vis-` a-vis monetary authorities, while playing a Nash game
against other unions. The equilibrium of this wage-setting game determines the growth of
nominal wages in the two countries. In the second stage each central bank chooses its money
supply simultaneously taking the other’s money supply and nominal wages as given. Thus each
monetary authority plays a Nash game against the other and acts as Stackelberg follower against
unions. Finally, after having observed money balances and negotiated nominal wages, private
sector (ﬁrms and households) responds with a sequence of prices and quantities that constitutes
a monopolistically competitive equilibrium at every point in time.
The timing protocol in which wage setting is determined before monetary policy is in line
with the literature on strategic interactions between central banks and unions (e.g. Soskice and
Iversen1998,2000,BratsiotisandMartin1999). Moreover, itreﬂectsthefactthatwagecontract
are usually ﬁxed for at least one year, while prices and the monetary stance can be adjusted more
frequently. The game is solved by backward induction.
3.1 Monetary policy
In the second stage of the game the two central banks play Nash against each other, taking as
given the nominal wage decisions made by both domestic and foreign unions in the ﬁrst stage.







where θ  1 αγ and θ  1 α(1 γ).
Monetary response to domestic wages depends on the degree of central bank conservatism.
Wage rises trigger inﬂationary pressures, but also a decrease in employment. It turns out that,
when the degree of domestic conservatism is relatively high (β > k
θ(1 θ)), monetary policy
11counteracts an increase in domestic wages so as to curb inﬂation. Conversely, when it is suf-
ﬁciently low (β < k
θ(1 θ)) monetary policy accommodates an increase in nominal wages so as
to boost employment. This result has been already investigated in the theoretical and empir-
ical literature (e.g. Coricelli et al. 2004, Lippi 2003, Cukierman et al. 1998). However, in an
open-economy setting (γ < 1), there is a further channel of interaction.
Result 1 An increase in the degree of central bank conservatism leads to a more expansionary
domestic monetary response to foreign employment.
Intuitively, a rise in foreign money supply increases foreign employment and appreciates
the domestic currency. The latter effect, however, improves the terms of trade in the Home
country, thereby reducing the CPI. It turns out that the Home central bank is induced to expand
its money supply due to the lower cost of an inﬂationary policy.
3.2 Wage setting and outcomes
Unions choose their wage in the ﬁrst stage of the game simultaneously. Each of them takes the
other unions’ nominal wages as given and acts as Stackelberg leader vis-` a-vis the two monetary
authorities, thereby internalizing the central banks’ reaction functions. As shown in the com-


















where η   ∂ logL(u)=∂ log(W(u)=P) > 1 is the real consumer wage elasticity (in absolute
value) of the demand for all labor types j 2 u and ˜ l  α=k is the efﬁcient (log) employment
level. As long as η is ﬁnite, equilibrium employment is below its efﬁcient level, ˜ l, and a




1=η in equation (14)), whereby a positive monetary shock unambiguously improves domestic
welfare in a closed economy (Blanchard and Kiyotaki 1987).
Nevertheless, as noted by Corsetti and Pesenti (2001), in an open economy this effect is not
sufﬁcient to prevent a deﬂationary monetary policy. Money contraction not only reduces both
12consumption and output, but also improves the terms of trade, thereby increasing consumption
and reducing output further. It turns out that the reduction in the disutility of supplying labor
services more than offsets the reduction in the utility from lower consumption since the “bur-
den” of production is shifted to the other country through the improved terms of trade. Such an
effect is captured by the negative term  (1 γ) in the square brackets in equation (14).
The real consumer wage elasticity of perceived labor demand, η   εh=(1 sh), is com-
posed of the elasticity of labor demand to nominal wage W(u),






































Equation (16) expresses the elasticity of domestic labor demand perceived by the u-th union as
a weighted average of the elasticity of substitution across labor types and the elasticity of aggre-
gate labor demand to changes in aggregate wage, εH  ∂ logL=∂ logW. The latter is a function
of aggregate demand faced by ﬁrms that, in turn, hinges on monetary stance. Intuitively, do-
mestic unions perceive an increase in wages as boosting domestic inﬂation through (17). This,
in turn, triggers two effects. First, as the domestic good becomes more expensive, households
reduce consumption of it and domestic labor demand falls. At the same time, higher domestic
prices boost CPI inﬂation. Thus, monetary conservatism decreases domestic employment even
further by curbing inﬂation.
It is worth noticing that atomistic wage setters (n ! ∞) neither internalize the impact of
their wage claims on inﬂation (equation (17) is equal to zero) nor the repercussion on aggregate
employment (equation (16) is equal to the elasticity of substitution σ). The weight of εH in
(16) is in fact increasing with the union’s size (lower n). This result stems from the fact that the












i.e. an increase in wage raises aggregate wage by 1=n in a symmetric equilibrium, W(u) =W.
This leads to inﬂationary pressures through ﬁrms’ optimal price conditions, which, in turn,
entail an aggregate demand reduction in the wake of conservative monetary policies.
The next section investigates the strategic mechanisms through which conservative mone-
tary policy may induce wage restraint.
134 Analysis of labor demand elasticity η
4.1 Strategic mechanisms
In order to gain an insight into the strategic channels operating in η, it is convenient to rewrite
the elasticities of labor demand to real wages η as follows:
(19) η =

   

1































The incentive to set a higher nominal wage, w(u), relies on the weighted combination of
three effects.
First, since other unions’ wages are taken as given, the u-th union perceives its wage as
increasing relative to other unions’ wages. At the same time, wage hikes boost the cost of
labor, inducing ﬁrms to substitute labor types j 2 u for other labor types j = 2 u. This effect
clearly depends on σ and is captured by the ﬁrst term in equation (19). Drawing on Lippi’s
(2003) terminology, it is labeled “substitution effect.” Notice that when the direct impact of
w(u) on w is less than one (namely when n > 1), unions exploit their monopolistic power over
differentiated labor services through the elasticity of substitution σ. In the extreme case of a
single all-encompassing union (n = 1), εh is equal to εH, so that the real labor demand η is void
of any substitution effect. A wage rise, in this case, leads to a proportional increase in aggregate
wages without any possibility for the union of increasing its relative wage.
Second, the representative union anticipates that its wage demand causes a reduction in
employment through the elasticity of aggregate labor demand with respect to the real wage
rate paid by employers (measured in units of each country’s aggregate output). This effect is
captured by the second term in equation (19) and labeled “output effect” as in Lippi (2003).
In a closed economy, the producer price index coincides with the consumer price index.
Therefore, Lippi’s analysis (2003) focuses on these two strategic effects only. In this model, η
is formed by the output and substitution effect, but also by a third effect which I label “terms-
of-trade effect.” This component is present as long as the Home employment elasticity to Home
wages (εH) is different from the Foreign employment elasticity to Home wages (εH). Intu-
itively, each domestic union has an incentive to boost inﬂation so as to improve the terms of
trade which, in turn, raise the real wage of Home workers relative to Foreign workers. Holding
Foreign inﬂation constant, higher relative inﬂation in the Home country entails an expenditure
switching from the domestically produced good to the foreign produced good, but also a pro-
duction switching from domestic worker to foreign workers. It turns out that the terms-of-trade
14effect produces a “beggar-thy-neighbor” welfare spillover, thereby encouraging wage hikes.9
However, conservative monetary policy in the Foreign country can dampen such a channel.
Result 2 The terms-of-trade effect and equilibrium real wage rate are lower, the more conser-
vative is the foreign central bank.











is decreasing with the degree of Foreign central bank conservatism.
Intuitively, aconservativemonetaryauthorityintheForeigncountryrespondstoHomewage
hikes by tightening its monetary policy to curb imported inﬂation. This leads to a depreciation
of the Home currency relative to the Foreign currency, and a lower relative inﬂation in the Home
country. Therefore, a conservative monetary policy in the Foreign country has the overall effect
of dampening the incentive to engage in strategic use of wage pressures through the terms-of-
trade channel.
The domestic conservative monetary policy has been extensively investigated in the litera-
ture (e.g. Gnocchi 2009, Coricelli et al. 2006, Cavallari 2004), while foreign conservatism has
been disregarded by these studies. Korpos (2006) also argues that foreign central bank conser-
vatism has important implications for wage setting, but this argument is centered only on the
substitution and output effects.
4.2 Centralization of wage bargaining
This section assesses the real effects of centralized wage-bargaining system.


































Equation (20) is a weighted average measuring the monopolistic distortion in the labor market.
9In a ﬁrst generation of game-theory models ` a la Canzoneri and Henderson (1988), Jensen (1993) highlights
that the real exchange rate appreciation drives a wedge between the consumer and producer real wage, thereby
inducing unions to be more aggressive in their wage demands.










From the above expression it is apparent that n and εH have two opposing effects on the weight
attached to the elasticity of labor demand to real wage. More speciﬁcally, an increase in the
number of unions reduces equation (21), while an increase in aggregate labor demand elasticity
raises it.
Result 3 A rise in the number of unions, i.e. a more decentralized wage setting, increases
(reduces) welfare and reduces (increases) inﬂation if σ > η








The intuition for this result stems directly from equation (20). Since 1=η is a linear combination
of 1=σ and 1=η
   
n=1, an increase in n puts more weight on the substitution effect operating in
the labor demand elasticity, so that equilibrium employment rises and inﬂation diminishes only
if σ > η
   
n=1. The opposite case occurs when σ < η
   
n=1.10 Furthermore, since employment
is inefﬁciently low, an increase in labor demand elasticity is accompanied by an increase in
welfare as well. It follows that welfare gains hinge on complementarity between labor market
distortions and centralization of wage setting. More speciﬁcally, labor markets featuring size-
able monopolistic distortions (small σ) call for centralized wage bargaining. Conversely, when
monopolistic distortions are low (large σ), a decentralized wage-bargaining system performs
better.
This result differs from Coricelli et al. (2004). In their work a rise in the number of unions
always worsens Home economic performance. This is due to the different location of the sub-
stitution effect assumed. While in this paper the substitution stems from different types of labor
inputs needed to produce a single output in each country, in Coricelli et al. (2004) the substitu-
tion between different kinds of labor is a consequence of substitutability between the demands
for the differentiated goods produced by each type of labor in each country.
It is worth noticing that Result 3 qualiﬁes Lippi’s conclusions. With 1<n<∞, Lippi (2003)
spells out how in a closed economy both the elasticity of substitution among labor types and the
elasticity of aggregate labor demand to nominal wages affect η. Here, a domestic union also
internalizes the impact on the terms of trade. It turns out that not only substitution and output
effects affect welfare; the terms-of-trade effect also accounts for unions’ wage demands in an
open economy.
10Notice that for given values of σ and η
 
 
n=1, Result 3 entails a monotonic relation between the degree of
centralizationinwagesettingandeconomicperformance. ThisisincontrastwiththeU-shapedcurve ` alaCalmfors
and Drifﬁll (1988). The main reason for the absence of a Calmfors-Drifﬁll curve is that the model features a
constant elasticity of substitution between labor types (see Guzzo and Velasco 1999).
164.3 Central bank conservatism
How does domestic monetary conservatism affect welfare?
Result 4 As long as n 2 (1;∞), an increase in central bank conservatism β raises (reduces)
welfare if σ < η








Conservative monetary policy implies that the central bank accommodates wage hikes to a
lesser extent, thereby leading to higher (in absolute value) aggregate labor demand elasticities
εH. This increases the weight attached to the component 1=η
   
n=1 in (20). As a consequence, if
σ <η
   
n=1, a more conservative central bank is beneﬁcial in terms of welfare because it reduces
labor market distortions. Conversely, if
(
σ > η
   
n=1
)
, society would be better off with a less
conservative central bank.
Result 4 is in contrast with the ﬁndings of Jensen (1993) and Coricelli et al. (2004) that a
more conservative central bank always boosts employment. This result hinges on the fact that
the production function in Jensen does not exhibit any substitution effect, while in Coricelli,
Cukierman, and Dalmazzo the substitution between different kinds of labor only stems from
the substitutability between the demands for the differentiated goods produced by each type of
labor in each country.
5 Concluding remarks
The paper studies conservative monetary policies in an open economy with non-atomistic wage
setters. As in Lippi (2003), I ﬁnd that monetary conservatism can yield real equilibrium out-
comes. However, this result hinges on a further strategic channel: the labor union’s incentive—
through wage claims—to engage in strategic use of the terms of trade.
Installing a foreign conservative central bank dampens this incentive, thereby raising wel-
fare gains. The welfare effects of domestic conservatism, instead, are contingent on the relative
size of three strategic effects. When the output and terms-of-trade effects dominate the substi-
tution effect, it is optimal to appoint a more conservative monetary authority. Therefore, Lippi’s
conclusions, according to which conservative monetary policy and centralized wage setting af-
fect equilibrium employment only through the output and substitution effects, are qualiﬁed to
allow for the terms-of-trade effect.
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